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FROM AMBIVALENCE TO 
CERTAINTY: NORMS AND 
PRINCIPLES FOR THE STRUCTURAL 
INTERDICT IN SOCIO-ECONOMIC 




The parsimonious approach of the Constitutional Court in using the structural interdict 
in socio-economic rights cases has both been critiqued and also contrasts with that of the 
High Courts. Moreover, the Court has neither given a principled basis for its rejection 
and use of the remedy nor laid down any norms and principles for determining when 
the remedy is appropriate. Starting from these bases, this article highlights norms and 
principles which could guide the courts in determining when the structural interdict is 
appropriate, and its modalities. Drawing upon Amersican jurisprudence, the article pro-
poses norms and principles including utilisation of the structural interdict in a graduated 
manner as a remedy of last resort; participation of all stakeholders; judicial impartiality 
and independence; reasoned decision making; remediation which enforces the substantive 
norms; and flexibility.
i introduCtion
The South African Constitutional Court has been admonished for its reluc-
tance to use the structural interdict as a remedy in socio-economic rights 
cases. The Court’s reluctance is considered by some critiques to be one of 
the reasons why adjudication of socio-economic rights has not made a very 
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big impact in the lives of the poor.1 The reluctance is also viewed as one of 
the reasons for failure by the executive to enforce the Constitutional Court’s 
orders. This is in addition to the failure of the Court to monitor the enforce-
ment of its orders.2 The approach of the Constitutional Court in using the 
structural interdict in socio-economic rights cases contrasts with that of the 
High Courts. Unlike the Constitutional Court, the High Courts have readily 
availed themselves of this form of relief to enforce socio-economic rights.3 
The approach of the Constitutional Court also differs between civil and politi-
cal rights litigation and socio-economic rights litigation. The Constitutional 
Court has readily issued the structural interdict in litigation touching on the 
civil and political rights in the Constitution.4 The Court has acknowledged the 
availability of this form of relief as an appropriate, just and equitable remedy 
in socio-economic rights litigation. In spite of this, the Court has declined to 
use the relief on the basis that the executive has always respected its orders; 
this is so even in those cases where there is evidence to the contrary.5
What is more apparent, however, is that the Constitutional Court has been 
ambivalent in determining the circumstances under which the structural 
interdict would be considered an appropriate, just and equitable remedy. 
The Court has neither given a principled basis for its rejection and use of 
the remedy nor laid down any norms and principles for determining when 
the remedy is appropriate. This could be one of the reasons that the Court’s 
approach has received more negative criticism than praise.6 In spite of this, 
1 M Swart ‘Left out in the Cold? Crafting Constitutional Remedies for the Poorest of the Poor’ (2005) 
21 SAJHR 215, 228. See also D Bilchitz ‘Giving Socio-economic Rights Teeth: The Minimum Core 
and its Importance’ (2002) 118 SALJ 484, 501.
2 DM Davis ‘Socio-economic Rights in South Africa: The Record of the Constitutional Court after 
Ten Years’ (2004) 5 ESR Review 3, 5. See also DM Davis ‘Adjudicating the Socio-economic Rights 
in the South African Constitution: Towards “Deference Lite”’ (2006) 22 SAJHR 300, 312. Davis 
argues that a refusal to grant a structural interdict has prevented the Constitutional Court from 
monitoring the efficacy of any order granted and hence being compelled to engage in the very 
mechanisms of policy implementation. 
3 See Grootboom v Oostenberg Municipality and Others 2000 (3) BCLR 277 (C) (Grootboom 
Oostenberg case); S v Zuba and 23 similar cases 2004 (4) BCLR 410 (E) (Zuba case); City of Cape 
Town v Rudolph and Others 2003 (11) BCLR 1236 (C) (Rudolph case), Centre for Child Law and 
Others v MEC for Education and Others, Case No. 19559/06 [Unreported] (the Luckhoff case), 
High Courts Transvaal Provincial Division; and EN and Others v Government of RSA and Others 
2007 (1) BCLR 84 (D) (Westville case).
4 See August and Another v Electoral Commission 1999 (4) BCLR 363 (CC) (August case); and 
Sibiya and Others v DPP, Johannesburg High Courts and Others, 2006 (2) BCLR 293 (CC) (Sibiya 
case). 
5 See, for instance, Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 
(CC) (TAC case), where the Minister of Health, Manto Tshabalala-Msimang indicated openly, in 
the public arena, that government would not abide by any orders made against it by the Court. 
Rationalising the decisions to appeal the High Court judgment, the Minister reasoned that if this 
judgment were allowed to stand, it would create a precedent that could be used by a wide variety 
of interest groups wishing to exercise quite specific influences on government policy in the area of 
socio-economic rights, and could open the way for a spate of court applications and ‘policy judg-
ments’. See ‘Government, not Courts, must Decide HIV/AIDS and Other Social Policy’ Sunday 
Times 30 December 2001.
6 See note 1 above. 
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with a few exceptions,7 the critics have not come to the aid of the Court by 
comprehensively defining norms and principles that could govern this type 
of remedy. The critics have been motivated, arguably, mainly by frustration 
that socio-economic rights litigation has thus far not resulted in rapid socio-
economic transformation, as was eagerly anticipated at the adoption of the 
Constitution. There is also a general feeling that victories at the conclusion 
of socio-economic rights cases have been hollow, as the lives of successful 
litigants have not improved dramatically.8
It is not my intention to undermine the relevance and basis of the frustra-
tion above. The objective of this paper is to highlight norms and principles 
which could guide the courts in determining when the structural interdict 
is appropriate, and its modalities. The norms and principles suggested here 
therefore provide a principled basis for either rejecting or using the struc-
tural interdict. They will also provide a foundation upon which to critique the 
courts’ approach as regards the use of the structural interdict in future. These 
norms and principles should, by their nature, be capable of application in a 
number of contexts. This is because, rather than attempt to construct a rigid 
rule, courts should focus on the broad principles that guide the exercise of 
remedial discretion and ones that could be used in a variety of contexts.9 The 
norms and principles I propose include: utilisation of the structural interdict 
in a graduated manner as a remedy of last resort; participation of all stake-
holders; judicial impartiality and independence; reasoned decision making; 
remediation which enforces the substantive norms;10 and flexibility.
While some principles could be deduced from the approaches of the High 
Courts and Constitutional Court, these are not comprehensive and need to be 
enhanced and elaborated upon. I do not purport the principles I have enunci-
ated here to be exclusive; more principles will emerge from scholarly and 
judicial discourse as jurisprudence on the subject grows. The paper begins by 
understanding the rather novel remedy.
This paper places heavy reliance on United States literature and juris-
prudence in formulating the norms and principles deemed relevant to South 
Africa. The reason for this is obvious; the United States judiciary is credited 
with being the initiator of this form of relief. Yet the controversial nature of 
the structural interdict, as a constitutional remedy, has generated a large vol-
ume of scholarly work.11
7 See K Roach and G Budlender ‘Mandatory Relief and Supervisory Jurisdiction: When is it 
Appropriate, Just and Equitable?’ (2005) 122 SALJ 325, 351. 
8 See Swart (note 1 above) and Davis (note 2 above). 
9 Roach & Budlender (note 7 above) 333. 
10 See S Sturm ‘A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies’ (1991) 79 GLJ 1355. 
11 See, for instance, Sturm (as above); D Horowitz ‘Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial 
Supervision of Public Institutions’ (1983) Duke LJ 1265; M Schlanger ‘Beyond the Hero Judge. 
Institutional Reform Litigation as Litigation’ (1999) 97 Michigan LR 1994; Chayes, supra (note 13); 
F Sabel and H Simon ‘Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds’ (2004) 117 
Harv L R 1015; S Diver ‘The Judge as Political Powerbroker: Superintending Structural Change in 
Public Institutions (1979) 65 Vir L R 43; and Eisenberg & Yeazell (note 24 below).
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ii anatoMy of the struCtural interdiCt
In the South African context, the structural interdict could be described as 
a recent development ‘created by a new and transformative constitutional 
order’.12 The structural interdict is a complicated form of interdict, which 
involves the continued participation of the court in the implementation of its 
orders. Once the court has handed down its judgment and made an order, it 
does not relinquish the case. Instead, it monitors the implementation of its 
orders and may require the parties to report back to it in this regard.13 The 
structural interdict as a remedy in constitutional litigation is traced back to the 
United States school desegregation cases. The leading case in this respect is 
Brown v Board of Education.14 This case was propelled by the need to realise 
transformation of the dual school system, based on race, into a unitary and 
non-racial school system. It required a great deal of organisational reform to 
transform the entrenched racial segregation, which had survived for hundreds 
of years. The courts were required to transform this entrenched status quo 
and to reconstruct the social reality in a radical manner. What was required 
included establishing new procedures for student assignments, new criteria 
for construction of schools, revision of transport routes, re-assignment of 
facilities, curricular modifications, reallocation of resources, and above all, 
establishing equity in the school system. The question is whether all these 
objectives would have been achieved through the conventional one-stance 
traditional litigation and remedial procedures. The answer is a definite no; it 
required protracted and unusual methods of litigation and remediation; hence 
the resort to the structural interdict to ensure that the obstinate school and 
local authorities implemented the desired reforms.
The functions of the structural interdict are various and determined by 
the circumstances and demands of each case. Unlike other forms of inter-
dicts or remedies, such as damages, the purpose of a structural interdict 
is not deterrence or compensation as such. In broad terms, its purpose is 
the elimination of systemic violations existing especially in institutional or 
organisational settings.15 Rather than compensate for past wrongs, it seeks 
to adjust future behaviour, and is deliberately fashioned rather than logi-
cally deduced from the nature of the legal harm suffered. Its most prominent 
feature is the creation of a complex ongoing regime of performance, and it 
is not a one-shot and one-way approach to providing judicial remedies.16 
Its ongoing nature is facilitated by the court’s retention of jurisdiction, and 
sometimes by the court’s active participation in the implementation of the 
decree. By using the structural interdict, the courts disregard the traditional 
12 Roach & Budlender (note 7 above) 328. 
13 For a discussion of the features of this form of relief, see A Chayes ‘The Role of the Judge in Public 
Law Litigation’ (1979) 89 Harv LR 1281. See also W Trengove ‘Judicial Remedies for Violations 
of Socio-economic Rights’ (1999) 1 ESR Review 8.
14 349 US 294 (Brown case).
15 See S Liebenberg ‘The Value of Human Dignity in Interpreting Socio-economic Rights’ (2005) 21 
SAJHR 1, 30.
16 Chayes (note 13 above) 1298.
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functus officio doctrine. This doctrine requires that once a court has made 
a final determination of a matter, its jurisdiction over the case ceases, and 
the case is closed.17
The structural interdict is a response to the inadequacy of traditional 
remedies in responding to systemic violations of a complex organisational 
nature.18 The traditional remedies, such as damages and ordinary interdicts, 
may not effectively eliminate systemic violations. In a setting of systemic 
violations, what would be most appropriate are those remedies which aim at 
achieving structural reforms by tackling the systemic problems at their root 
rather than by redressing their impact. This may require development of 
ongoing measures designed to eliminate the identified mischief,19 and to pro-
mote participation of not only the parties but also third parties in the remedy 
selection process. Dealing with systemic violations in institutional settings 
also requires a continued establishment of facts and the continual interplay 
between such facts and the legal consequences.20 This is important because in 
such cases, the problems could have their roots in the structural characteris-
tics of the institution itself.21 Facts which enhance the court’s understanding 
of the nature of the institution, therefore, become relevant at all stages of the 
case.22 The cases may also require frequent redetermination of liability and 
reformulation of relief.23
It is because of these factors that the structural interdict has become a 
preferred remedy in what has been described as structural or institutional 
suits.24 These suits challenge large scale government deficiencies, sometimes 
arising out of organisational or administrative failure. The causes of the 
failure are various: failure to use (or misuse of) discretion; negligence; failure 
to comprehend the law; administrative red tape; and deliberate disregard of 
rights. Usually these suits are preceded by political pressure and instituted 
only when this is unsuccessful. Even when they are filed, however, political 
pressure may continue to be exerted on the government.25 The suits are usually 
multi-partied, with large numbers of plaintiffs, who may act in a representative 
capacity for known and unknown victims. The suits could also have amici 
17 For a detailed discussion of the functus officio doctrine see D Pretorius ‘The Origins of the Functus 
Officio Doctrine with Specific Reference to its Application in Administrative Law’ (2005) 122 SALJ 
832. See also Special Project ‘The Remedial Process in Institutional Reform Litigation’ (1978) 
Colum LR 784, 816.
18 Sturm (note 10 above) 1357.
19 Chayes (note 13 above) 1297. See also Special Project (note 17 above) 812.
20 Chayes ibid.
21 Note ‘Implementation Problems of Institutional Reform Litigation’ (1998) 91 Harv LR 428, 433.
22 It has been submitted that understanding the institution will permit the policy maker, whether 
administrative or judicial, to anticipate obstacles to implementation and develop strategies of sur-
mounting the obstacles. Ibid 435.
23 Special Project (note 17 above) 790. In fact, the Special Project has described the resulting decree 
as resembling a legislative or executive act.
24 See W Fletcher ‘The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy’ 
(1982) Yale LJ 635, 637; T Eisenberg & Yeazell (note 11 above).
25 Fletcher (as above).
FROM AMBIVALENCE TO CERTAINTY 5
and interveners, and may be instituted against a multitude of government 
departments and institutions.
Courts have adopted different models of the structural interdict, not only in 
different cases but at different levels of the same case. The most commonly-
used models include: the bargaining model; the legislative/administrative 
hearing model; the expert remedial formulation model; the report back to 
court model; and the consensual remedial formulation model.26
(a) Bargaining model
The bargaining model involves making remedial decisions through negotia-
tion by the parties involved in the case. The biggest advantage of this model is 
that it produces a remedy that is acceptable to all the parties, thereby easing 
implementation.27 The negotiation process could also bring to the fore facts 
and issues which may have been ignored by the court, yet are relevant to 
having an effective remedy. Such facts and issues will emerge from the per-
spectives of all the parties. 28
(b) Legislative/administrative hearing model
The legislative/administrative hearing model resembles a legislative 
committee process providing for public hearings and direct informal par-
ticipation by interested parties.29 This model allows persons not originally 
party to the litigation, but who may be interested in the case, to participate 
in the formulation of the remedy. It is an effective model in responding to 
polycentric interests which may be implicated in the case.30 The problem of 
polycentricity in adjudication is deduced from the writings of Lon Fuller.31 
Fuller argues that certain tasks are unsuited for judicial adjudication because 
any decisions on them will have multiple repercussions which may be dif-
ficult for the decision maker to comprehend. He identifies socio-economic 
rights as such matters, and discourages their adjudication through judicial 
means.32 In spite of this, the court may use the legislative/administrative 
model to appreciate all the interest in so called polycentric socio-economic 
rights cases.
26 See Sturm (note 10 above) 1368–75.
27 Special Project (note 17 above) 810.
28 See the United States case of Liddle v Board of Education of the City of St. Louis 491 F. Supp. 351 
(E.D.Mo.1980).
29 See Sturm (note 10 above) 1370.
30 An example of a case where this model was used is the US case of Pennsylvania Association for 
Retarded Children v Pennsylvania 334 F.Supp. 1257 (E D. Pa. 1971) (PARC case). 
31 L Fuller ‘The Forms and Limits of Adjudication’ (1978) 92 Harv LR 353.
32 I have critiqued Fuller’s ideas in this regard and applied these to the adjudication of socio-economic 
rights. See C Mbazira ‘Confronting the Problem of Polycentricity in Enforcing the Socio-economic 
Rights in the South African Constitution’ (2008) 23 SAPR/PL 30.
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(c) Expert remedial formulation model
The expert remedial formulation model involves the appointment of either 
an individual expert or a panel of experts with a mandate to develop a reme-
dial plan. Sometimes these experts are designated as court officials and have 
judicial powers. The court-appointed experts in structural litigation differ 
from those in other forms of litigation. Experts in other forms of litigation 
are always restricted to fact-finding mandates. By contrast, the experts in 
structural litigation are usually mandated to design and propose a remedial 
plan.33 The expert could even be designated as an administrator with a man-
date to take over and manage the institution under scrutiny for the purpose 
of effecting reforms. The expert model is particularly relevant in cases where 
specialised and technical skill is required to formulate an appropriate remedy; 
for instance, where there is a need to appreciate some social information facts 
before formulating the order.34 The court may not have the expertise and skill 
to ascertain the social facts. This does not mean, however, that the parties are 
left out of the remedy-finding process. In spite of their skills, the experts may 
be obliged to consult with the parties in formulating the remedial plans.35 This, 
like the legislative hearing model, is intended to ensure that polycentric inter-
ests are considered and that the remedy is acceptable not only to the parties 
but also to other stakeholders who may play a role in its implementation.36
(d) Report back to court model
The report back to court model is the most commonly-used model and is 
implemented by requiring the defendant to report back to the court with a 
plan on how he or she intends to remedy the violation. Usually a fixed date 
is set for the filing of the plan, and the other party is given an opportunity to 
comment on the plan. It is only when the court is satisfied with the plan that it 
will concretise it as part of its final order.
The report back model has a number of advantages. First, it allows the court 
to defer to the defendant (often the government) on the most effective way of 
eliminating the violation. This promotes the doctrine of separation of powers 
and shields the court from accusations that it has usurped functions reserved 
for the other organs of state. The model also enables the court to harness the 
expertise that may be in the hands of the defendant. Where government is the 
defendant, the court could harness the usually rich expertise at the disposal 
of the state bureaucracy. Second, it allows for a self-imposed remedy from 
the defendant, which makes implementation of the remedy much simpler. It 
is highly unlikely that the defendant will propose a plan that he or she cannot 
carry out. In the case of government, such remedy will be calculated very 
33 See Special Project (note 17 above) 805.
34 See ibid 795.
35 An example of this is found in Hart v Community School Board 383 F.Supp. 699 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). 
In this case, the order of reference required the expert to solicit views not only from the parties but 
also from community groups within the district. 
36 See Sturm (note 10 above) 1419–20.
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meticulously to cater for government’s budgetary and related needs. However, 
the process may not be left entirely to the defendant, as both the court and the 
opposite party are afforded an opportunity to scrutinise the plan. In fact, the 
court may reject the plan if it is considered inadequate.
(e) Consensual remedial formulation model
The consensual remedial formulation model also tries to secure the consensus 
of the parties and third parties in the formulation of the remedy, and brings 
the same advantages as the bargaining model.37 This model allows parties 
to exchange views and raise contests in a less formal manner. It also fosters 
a good working relationship between the parties, and participation may be 
open to a variety of stakeholders. It is, however, important that the process be 
opened up to as many participants as possible. This is because the exclusion of 
persons who, although not parties to the suit, may be affected by its outcome, 
could hamper effective implementation of the resulting court order, as such 
person may put up opposition to it.38 At the same time, the process should not 
be opened unnecessarily to such an extent that reaching agreements becomes 
impossible because of the wide range of interests. The process should be 
directed by a third party able to co-ordinate and ensure the participation of 
all stakeholders.
The consensual remedial formulation model is in many respects similar 
to the bargaining model. The difference is that the consensual formulation 
model is less formalised and is readily opened to third party participants. 
The consensual public dispute resolution usually requires the assistance of a 
third party who acts as the keeper of the process and assumes responsibility 
for convening the deliberations, assisting groups in choosing spokespersons, 
helping to establish ground rules and an agenda, and identifying and obtain-
ing expert assistance.39 It is important to note, though, that, just as with the 
bargaining model, the consensual model will work only where the parties are 
willing to compromise and have an interest in resolving a dispute. This could 
be because of a shared history or commitment to a shared cause. The model 
would not work well where the parties hold intractable and irreconcilable 
views that leave no room for compromise.
iii the south afriCan approaCh
(a) The approach of the High Courts
The High Courts have rejected the view that a declaratory order would be 
the only sufficient remedy for the government to implement orders from the 
37 An example of this is in United States v Michigan 471 F.Supp. 192 (W.D. Mich. 1979), where a 
third party was appointed to assist the parties to come to an agreement on the allocation of fishing 
waters between tribes.
38 See M Schwarzschild ‘Public Law by Private Bargain: Title VII Consent Decrees and the Fairness 
of Negotiated Institutional Reform’ (1984) 5 Duk LJ pp 887–935. 
39 Sturm (note 10) 1423. 
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courts. According to the Court, a declaratory order without injunctive relief 
lacks practical content.40 Most importantly, however, the High Courts have 
resorted to the structural interdict because of its importance both to the 
applicants and the government. The relief is useful in cases where there is 
insufficient information before the court to determine the most appropriate 
relief that would redress the violation. The retention of jurisdiction allows the 
Court to acquire additional evidence relevant for defining the remedy without 
having to bother the parties with filing new papers when more information 
emerges. It should also be noted that it would be fair to the respondent govern-
ment, which may need more time to come up with solutions. In one case the 
Court has held that:
In fairness to the respondents, who now know where their duty lies, they should be given 
an opportunity of proposing a practical solution. In fairness to the applicants, now that they 
know where their rights lie, respondents should be directed to make such proposals within a 
reasonable time. The applicants should furthermore have the opportunity of commenting on 
the proposal, and the respondents should be allowed to respond to such comment.41
The High Courts have also underlined the structural interdict as an appropri-
ate response to systemic violations. It has been observed by one court that 
other remedies, ‘such as declarator, the prohibitory interdict, mandamus, and 
awards of damages’, are inappropriate to remedy ‘systemic failures or the 
inadequate compliance with constitutional obligations, particularly when one 
is dealing with … rights of a programmatic nature’.42
Additionally, the High Courts have been motivated to grant structural inter-
dicts by the need to protect and promote the doctrine of separation of powers. 
The structural interdict has enabled the Court to give latitude to the executive 
branch of government by deferring to it on the most appropriate solutions 
to address unconstitutional conditions. In this respect, ‘[t]he structural 
injunction is not intended to substitute the judiciary for the administration, 
but to relieve the judge from framing relief in a way that would constitute 
democracy by judicial decree’.43 This, as seen above, is manifested in what 
the Court has described as the opportunity given to the respondent to propose 
a practical solution. According to Budlender, ‘structural interdicts can be 
deeply democratising. They create spaces for dialogue between the court, the 
government and civil society actors. In this way, they strengthen and deepen 
accountability and participation — the key elements of democracy’.44 Rather 
than violate the doctrine of separation of powers, the High Courts, therefore, 
view the structural interdict as a means of preserving the doctrine. The lati-
tude given to the government to fashion the remedy indicates that the High 
Courts are not prepared to assume functions that are preserved for the execu-
40 See Grootboom Oostenberg case (note 3 above). 
41 Grootboom Oostenberg case (note 3 above) 292. 
42 Zuba case (note 3 above) para 36. 
43 Davis (note 2 above) 6. 
44 G Budlender ‘The Role of the Courts in Achieving the Transformative Potential of Socio-economic 
Rights’ (2007) 8 ESR Review 9, 11. 
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tive organ of the state. The executive branch is, therefore, required to execute 
self-imposed rather than judicial imposed remedies.
It appears, however, that the main reason the High Courts have resorted 
to the structural interdict is to counter government recalcitrance.45 This is 
in addition to ‘the dilatory and lackadaisical approach taken’ by the state in 
some cases.46 The recent Westville case47 is evidence of this. The degree of 
recalcitrance exhibited by the government in this case makes it worthwhile 
discussing the case in detail. The AIDS Law Project (ALP) together with 
the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) commenced the case for 15 HIV/
AIDS positive prisoners from the Westville correction facility in Kwazulu-
Natal. The applicants sought orders to compel the government to remove all 
obstacles preventing the 15 and other similarly-placed prisoners from access-
ing anti-retroviral treatment (ARV treatment). They also sought an order that 
the government provide the 15 and other similarly-situated prisoners with 
ARV treatment, in accordance with the existing government Operational 
Plan for Comprehensive HIV and AIDS Care, Management and Treatment 
(Operational Plan).48 The applicants argued that the Operational Plan had not 
been implemented with reasonable speed and urgency.
The Court found implementation of the Operational Plan to be unreason-
able and inflexible, which had result in a disregard of the needs of prisoners. 
The respondents were ordered to remove the obstacles which prevented pris-
oners from accessing ARVs under the Operational Plan.49 The Court found 
the respondents to have acted with dilatoriness and a lack of commitment on 
their part.50 Even when some agreement had been reached between the parties 
outside court, this had not been honoured by the respondents, who instead 
chose to engage in adversarial litigation. This behaviour motivated the judge 
to retain jurisdiction and to order that the respondents file a plan within two 
weeks on how they intended to implement the court order.51
Rather than implement the court order in good faith, the respondents 
instead pursued a technicality-based appeal arising from the judge’s rejection 
of a recusal request, on the ground that one of the counsel for the applicants 
was his daughter. The respondents also failed to file the plan on the due date 
and instead sought to set aside an interim order made for the implementation 
of the orders of the Court pending the appeal. The application to stay the 
order came before Nicholson J,52 who found that irreparable harm would be 
suffered by the prisoners if the interim order were set aside. The harm that 
the prisoners would suffer was not comparable to the inconvenience likely 
45 See Rudolph case (note 3 above).
46 Luckhoff case (note 3 above) pages 7 to 9 of the unreported judgment. 
47 Note 3 above. 
48 Available at <http://www.info.gov.za/otherdocs/2003/aidsoperationalplan.pdf>.
49 See para 35.
50 See para 24. The judge found ‘a singular lack of commitment to appreciate the seriousness and 
urgency of the situation’.
51 See paras 32–33.
52 Also recorded as EN and Others v Government of RSA and Others Case No. 4576/06 
[Unreported].
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to be suffered by the state.53 Nicholson castigated the state for creating a 
constitutional crisis: ‘If the government ... has given such an instruction [to 
disobey the Court order] then we face a grave constitutional crisis involving 
a threat to the doctrine of separation of powers. Should that continue the 
members of the judiciary will have to consider whether their oath of office 
requires them to continue on the bench’.54
This judgment demonstrates how government recalcitrance can break 
down dialogue between the courts and the executive, and the struggles by 
the judiciary to restore this dialogue. The judgment also shows the minimal 
appreciation, if not misunderstanding, on the part of the executive of their 
constitutional obligations, and the role of the judiciary in reasserting these 
obligations through means such as the structural interdict. Rather than lead 
to a breakdown of the relationship between the judiciary and the executive, 
the structural interdict should be viewed as promoting a dynamic dialogue 
between these two branches. This dialogue is on the intricacies of implement-
ing court orders and actualising constitutional rights.55 It is clear from this 
case that, rather than be deferential, in some cases where there is evidence 
of recalcitrance from the start, use of a structural interdict as a remedy of 
first resort may be justified. The South African government has in the past 
exhibited inconsistence and incoherence towards the HIV/AIDS epidemic.56 
This leaves the courts with no option but to demand, on those occasions when 
cases are filed, concrete plans detailing the intended response to the problem. 
The persistence of the court in this case forced the government to give in and 
file a plan as earlier directed.57
It should be noted, however, that although the High Courts have readily 
availed themselves of the structural interdict and used it consistently, they 
have not devised clear principles that could determine when such remedy is 
appropriate. The courts have deemed the remedy appropriate whenever there 
is recalcitrance on the part of government. In spite of this, the judgments do 
not detail all the relevant principles needed to determine appropriateness and 
use of this form of relief. In addition, there should also be principles on how 
the remedy should be applied. The High Courts have, for instance, not deter-
mined the level of recalcitrance that would justify use of the remedy, let alone 
the causes of such recalcitrance. It is this lack of clear principles in respect of 
application of the structural interdict that has motivated me to craft a set of 
norms and principles applicable to this remedy.
53 Para 42 of Nicholson’s ruling. 
54 Para 32 of Nicholson’s judgment.
55 M Pieterse ‘Coming to Terms with Judicial Enforcement of Socio-economic Rights’ (2004) 20 
SAJHR 383, 414.
56 See ‘Aids Criticism: Manto Hits Back’ Mail & Guardian online 11 September 2006. See also D 
Bilchitz ‘Towards a Reasonable Approach to the Minimum Core: Laying the Foundations for Future 
Socio-economic Rights Jurisprudence’ (2003) 19 SAJHR 1, 24. 
57 See G Stolley ‘Prisons Dept Reveals Plan for Aids Drugs’ Mail & Guardian online 11 September 
2006.
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One should, however, underline some of the important principles which 
may be deduced from the High Courts’ approach. These principles, although 
not exhaustive, are relevant in designing a more comprehensive set of norms 
and principles, as is done later in this article. First, the High Courts have made 
it clear that the court should retain jurisdiction where the information before 
the court is not enough for the purpose of determining the most appropriate 
relief. In such case, the parties should be saved the trouble of having to insti-
tute fresh litigation when new evidence or facts come to the fore. Second, the 
structural interdict should be used as a means of showing respect to the other 
branches of the state in responding to the declared violation. This is especially 
so where the court is not clear on the most appropriate way of remedying the 
violation. The executive and legislative branches should be given the latitude 
to devise what they consider the best means of remedying the violation. The 
means should, however, be subject to scrutiny by the court and the opposite 
party. Lastly, the structural interdict should be resorted to in the face of gov-
ernment recalcitrance. Where there is evidence that the government will not 
comply, in good faith, with the orders of the court, the structural interdict is 
appropriate.58
(b) The approach of the Constitutional Court
The Constitutional Court has emphatically asserted its powers to grant all 
forms of relief including a structural interdict, and to exercise supervisory 
jurisdiction if need be.59 According to the Court, ‘[t]he power to grant manda-
tory relief includes the power where it is appropriate to exercise some form of 
supervisory jurisdiction to ensure that the order is implemented’.60 The Court 
also views the structural interdict as a practical remedy, which would eradi-
cate conduct giving rise to violation of constitutional rights.61 Like the High 
Courts, the Constitutional Court has deemed the structural interdict appropri-
ate in those cases where the information before the Court is inadequate for the 
purposes of making a final order.62 This is in addition to the lack of expertise 
on the part of the Court to make appropriate arrangements for the eradica-
tion of the violation.63 The Court has thus allowed those with information and 
expertise the time to devise and submit to the Court plans on how they intend 
to eradicate the violation.64
Again, like the High Courts, the Constitutional Court has used the struc-
tural interdict in those cases where there is evidence of lackadaisical conduct 
on the part of the government. In the Sibiya case,65 for instance, the Court 
was concerned that the process of commuting death sentences following the 
58 See also Roach & Budlender (note 7 above).
59 See Pretoria City Council v Walker 1998 (2) SA 363 (CC) (Pretoria Council case), para 96. 
60 TAC case (note 5 above), para 104.
61 See Pretoria Council case (note 56 above), para 96.
62 August case (note 4 above), para 39.
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid.
65 Note 4 above. 
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Makwanyane case66 had taken far too long.67 The Court, therefore, deemed 
the structural interdict appropriate in the circumstances. Government was 
ordered to take immediate steps to ensure that all sentences of death imposed 
before 5 June 1995 were set aside and replaced by an appropriate alterna-
tive sentence. The government was also required to report to the Court not 
later than 15 August 2005 on all the steps taken to comply with the order 
above. Instead of filing the report before 15 August 2005, the government 
on 12 August 2005 filed an application for extension of the time for filing 
the report.68 The Constitutional Court allowed the application and extended 
the time to 15 September 2005. Thereafter, however, even with the defects 
detected in the report filed on 15 September 2005, the Court granted the gov-
ernment still more time to rectify the defects and file another report by 7 
November 2005. But the November report was also lacking, to the extent that 
the sentences of some 28 people had not been substituted. A further extension 
was given to the government to file an additional report by 15 February 2006. 
Yet the February report still had names of persons whose sentences had not 
been substituted, which attracted a further extension to 15 May 2006. The 
May report was also not fully compliant; the sentence of one person had not 
been substituted. This led to a further extension of up to 1 September 2006. 
But before 1 September 2006 the government reported, to the satisfaction of 
the Court, that all sentences had been substituted.
This case is important in a number of respects. It is evidence of the fact that 
where the government fails to act in a timely manner in the face of a structural 
interdict, the Court is prepared to continue to engage the government until full 
compliance is obtained. This is because in some cases it is only after several 
rounds of engagement that government may fully comply.69 The Court and 
interested parties must, therefore, be patient and be prepared to engage the 
government on more than one occasion.
The case is also important because, at the end, the Court made some obser-
vations which could inform the procedures that ought to be followed when 
courts deem supervisory jurisdiction appropriate. These procedures are also 
relevant in developing a comprehensive set of norms and principles for the 
structural interdict. The Court observed that the supervisory process in the 
case had shown the following:
Successful supervision requires that detailed information be placed at the • 
disposal of a court;
66 S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC).
67 Sibiya case (note 4 above) para 60.
68 See Sibiya case (note 4 above).
69 Evidence of this approach can be found in the Rudolph case. In this case, the Court justified the 
structural interdict on the basis of the attitude of denial expressed by government by deliberately 
failing to recognise the plight of the respondents and applying the principles in the Grootboom 
case, to the effect that those in desperate need should not be ignored. There were several rounds 
of engagement until compliance was achieved. The municipality was made to return to court three 
times.
FROM AMBIVALENCE TO CERTAINTY 13
Supervision entails a careful analysis and evaluation of the details • 
provided;
Supervision cannot succeed without the full co-operation of others in the • 
process; and
Courts should be flexible in the supervisory process.•  70
As already mentioned, the willingness on the part of the Constitutional 
Court to exercise supervisory jurisdiction differs between civil and politi-
cal rights cases and socio-economic rights cases.71 The Constitutional Court 
has been reluctant to use this form of relief to enforce socio-economic rights. 
This reluctance has been inspired by what the Court considers to be a need 
to maintain the divide between itself and the other branches of the state as 
dictated by the doctrine of separation of powers. For the sake of maintaining 
the boundaries of separation of powers, the Constitutional Court has concep-
tualised the structural interdict as a remedy that should be used as a matter 
of last resort when all else fails. The Court has also been sceptical about the 
structural interdict in socio-economic rights cases because of its reluctance 
to be involved in protracted litigation in the implementation of its orders. 
According to one commentator, the Constitutional Court would like to be ‘a 
“one-stop shop” in resolving these cases — they do not want to look at a case 
again once they have decided on it’.72
According to Davis, ‘[t]he less the burden on the Constitutional Court to 
exercise supervision over the executive, the more comfortable it feels’.73 There 
is an indication that the remedy has been reserved for those cases where there 
is recalcitrance on the part of government to implement the directions of the 
Court. However, the Constitutional Court has been ambivalent in determining 
the existence of such recalcitrance in socio-economic rights cases. According 
to the former Chief Justice, Arthur Chaskalson:
If there is not the political will, supervisory orders are not likely to be effective and may drag 
courts into long drawn battles that could more appropriately and more effectively be fought 
on the political terrain. Those battles should be fought first, and if successful, the results are 
likely to be more effective than attempts to secure compliance through court supervision. 
A structural interdict may be necessary in a particular case to ensure that relief granted is 
effective relief; for instance if there is deliberate failure to heed a declaratory order or other 
relief granted by a court. But it should be a last resort and not a routine response to claims 
for the enforcement of socio-economic rights.74 [Emphasis mine]
70 Sibiya case (note 4), para 22.
71 See section I above. 
72 S Khoza ‘The Importance of a Dialogue on Strategies to Promote Socio-economic Rights in South 
Africa’ (2006) 7 ESR Review 6, 9. However, unlike the approach of the minority in the Canadian case 
of Doucet-Boudreau v Nova Scotia [2003] 3 S.C.R. 3 (Doucet-Boudreau case), the Constitutional 
Court has not radically rejected the structural interdict on the basis of such principles as functus 
officio. Instead, it has left its use open as a remedy that could be granted in ‘deserving cases’. 
73 Davis (note 2 above) 304.
74 Former Chief Justice Arthur Chaskalson’s speech ‘Implementing Socio-economic Rights: The Role 
of the Courts’, delivered as guest speaker at the 3rd Dullah Omar Memorial Lecture, organised by 
the Community Law Centre and the Faculty of Law at the University of the Western Cape 13 June 
2006 at p 31. 
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This appears to be the basis upon which the Constitutional Court rejected and 
set aside structural interdicts granted by the High Courts in the Grootboom 
and TAC cases.75 The Court also declined to comment on the structural inter-
dict that had been granted by the High Court in Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) 
Ltd and Others v President of RSA and Another (Modderklip case).76
The Constitutional Court’s reluctance to use the structural interdict in 
socio-economic rights cases has generated condemnation and castigation of 
the Court as undermining the socio-economic rights in the Constitution.77 
This is because it has left court orders powerless in the face of government 
recalcitrance. According to Davis:
... the Court’s … refusal to grant structural relief that would empower courts to supervise 
the implementation of their own orders has produced unfortunate results. Litigants have won 
cases and government has done little to produce the tangible benefits that these litigants were 
entitled to expect from their success. The Court, in effect, has surrendered its powers to 
sanction government inertia and, as a direct result, litigants have not obtained the shelter or 
drugs that even a cursory reading of the judgments promised.78
It has also been submitted that exercising supervisory jurisdiction in socio-
economic rights cases would have saved the time and expenses that parties 
would have to endure to challenge state action through filing fresh suits.79
The Constitutional Court’s reluctance to exercise supervisory jurisdiction 
in socio-economic rights cases, just like its rejection of the minimum core 
obligations approach, appears to be rooted in the need to preserve the bound-
aries of the separation of powers.80 The Court has been particularly cautious 
to defer to the executive branch as regards issues of budgetary allocation. In 
those cases where the Court has risen to the occasion to interpret the rights, it 
has also been keen to push the cases out of its doors as soon as possible. This 
would not be possible if jurisdiction were retained, as the Court would have 
to engage in budgetary issues in the course of its supervision. This could be 
one of the factors which explain the ambivalent approach of the Constitutional 
Court, as well as its differentiated approach as regards civil and political rights 
litigation when compared to socio-economic rights litigation. For instance, 
while affirming its powers to make a structural interdict in the TAC case, the 
75 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom & Others 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC); 
2001 (1) SA 46 (CC), and TAC case (note 5 above).
76 2005 (8) BCLR 786 (CC).
77 See D Bilchitz ‘Health’ in S Woolman, T Roux, J Klaaren, A Stein & M Chaskalson (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa (1996) Juta & Company and Centre for Human Rights, 
University of Pretoria [2nd Edition, Original Service 2005] pp 56A-i to 56A-47, at p 56A-24. See 
also M Heywood ‘Preventing Mother-to-child HIV Transmission in South Africa: Background, 
Strategies and Outcomes of the Treatment Action Campaign Case against the Minister of Health’ 
(2003) 19 SAJHR 278, 312; Swart (note 1 above); and Davis (note 2 above). 
78 Davis (note 2 above) 6.
79 Bilchitz (note 1 above) 510. 
80 See T Roux ‘Legitimating Transformation: Political Resource Allocation in the South African 
Constitutional Court’ (2003) 10 Democratization 92; and D Brand ‘The Proceduralisation of 
South African Socio-economic Rights Jurisprudence, or “What are Socio-economic Rights for?”’ 
in H Botha, A Van der Walt & J Van der Walt (eds) Rights and Democracy in a Transformative 
Constitution (2003) 33, 51. 
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Court cautioned that due regard must be paid to the roles of the legislature and 
the executive in a democracy.81
In order to respect the other branches of state, the Court has, even in the 
face of government recalcitrance, struggled to convince itself that government 
would comply with its orders in good faith. In the TAC case, for instance, 
the Court declined to grant the structural interdict because, in its opinion, 
‘the government has always respected and executed orders of this Court’ 
and there was ‘no reason to believe that it will not do so’.82 This conclusion 
appears to have been motivated by evidence that emerged during the hearing 
that the government had ‘made substantial additional funds available for the 
treatment of HIV, including the reduction of mother to child transmission’.83 
However, this evidence blinded the Constitutional Court to the high degree 
of recalcitrance demonstrated by the State during the hearing of the case, 
particularly the declaration by the Minister of Health that the government 
would not respect the judgment of the Court.84 Recalcitrance, in addition to 
the seriousness of the matter in issue, saving innocent babies from a deadly 
disease, was justification for the issuance of a structural interdict.85 This mat-
ter was especially serious because of the generally inadequate response of the 
government in tackling the HIV/AIDS epidemic. As already observed above, 
the policy of the government in relation to HIV has been notable for its very 
slow progress in coming to terms with the health crisis facing the country. 
There had indeed been a tremendous amount of bungling and a high degree of 
reluctance expressed with regard to providing nevirapine.86
At the very least, the Constitutional Court should have retained jurisdiction, 
without requiring that a report be filed by a stated date. The Court could have 
left itself open to whichever party wanting to contest the manner in which the 
order was being implemented.87 The mere fact that the Court retained jurisdic-
tion over the case could have propelled the government to act more cautiously 
because of the knowledge that any deleteriousness would easily be brought to 
the attention of the Court and might also spark media frenzy.
The Court would have only graduated into more specific and detailed direc-
tions, if necessary, on the basis of the evidence brought before it by those who 
81 Para 137.
82 Para 129.
83 Para 120, the evidence indicated an increment in the HIV treatment budget from R350 million to 
R1 billion which would increase to R1,8 million the following year.
84 See Bilchitz (note 56 above) 23–24.
85 Geoff Budlender has submitted that one of the indications of whether a structural interdict is 
appropriate is the risk of severe consequences, such as loss of life, even in the case of good faith 
failure on the part of government to comply with its obligations. G Budlender ‘Justiciability of 
Socio-economic Rights: Some South African Experiences’ in Y Ghai and J Cottrell (eds) Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights in Practice  The Role of Judges in Implementing Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (2004) 33, 358. See also D Bilchitz ‘Placing Basic Needs at the Centre of Socio-
economic Rights Jurisprudence’ (2003) 4 ESR Review 2, 4; and Roach & Budlender (note 7 above) 
333. 
86 Bilchitz (note 56 above) 23–24.
87 Unlike the declaration in the Grootboom case, this would not have caused any confusion, as the 
order made in this case was a clear mandatory direction as to what had to be done.
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would have come back to it, and by the attitude of the government. Although 
this may have exposed the Constitutional Court to protracted litigation, a thing 
that the Court wanted to avoid, it would have been beneficial in many respects. 
It would have demonstrated that in cases dealing with serious matters, and 
where recalcitrance is detected, the Court would engage with a case until its 
orders are implemented just as it did in the Sibiya case.88
The retention of jurisdiction would have further enabled the Court to 
continue to engage the state as regards the mechanisms of policy imple-
mentation.89 Indeed, as a matter of fact, it is only through litigation that the 
courts can engage the other organs of state in litigation on matters of policy 
implementation and its impact on human rights. Maximising engagement of 
this nature is justified, amongst others, by the fact that not so many cases 
have been filed before the Constitutional Court since the Constitution was 
adopted. It is, therefore, important that the Court should takes full advantage 
of those cases before it to engage fully with the other organs of state. This 
can be done effectively only if supervisory jurisdiction is retained in deserv-
ing cases. Another opportunity for such engagement may arise only after a 
considerably long time. It is, for instance, almost eight years since the TAC 
case was heard. Yet, in spite of the contentions surrounding the government’s 
response to HIV/AIDS, the Court has not had another opportunity to engage 
the government on this epidemic. In this regard, the TAC case was a very good 
opportunity for the Court to use the structural interdict in order to elicit an 
adequate response from the state.
(c) Rand Properties case — a flicker of hope?
The recent case of Occupiers of 15 Olivia Road and Others v City of 
Johannesburg and Others (Olivia case)90 introduces a new dimension into 
the discussion of the approach of the Constitutional Court to the structural 
interdict. This case, which began in the High Court of Johannesburg, was 
instituted by more than 400 occupiers of two ‘bad’ buildings in Johannesburg 
to resist their eviction, which was scheduled to take place in pursuit of the City 
of Johannesburg’s regeneration programme. The programme was intended to 
revamp the city by, among others, rehabilitating all ‘bad’ buildings. The High 
Court had found that the City’s programme fell short of the requirement to 
provide suitable relief for the people in the city who were in a crisis or in 
desperate need of housing. The Court interdicted the eviction. On appeal to 
88 Note 4 above. 
89 Davis (note 2 above) 312. 
90 Case CCT 24/07 [2008] ZACC 1. For a discussion of the history of this case see L Chenwi & 
S Liebenberg ‘The Constitutional Protection of those Facing Eviction from Bad Buildings’ (2008) 
9(1) ESR Review 12. 
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the Supreme Court of Appeal,91 the Court found the buildings to be unsafe 
and authorised the eviction of the occupiers and ordered them to vacate.92 The 
occupiers appealed to the Constitutional Court against their eviction. In the 
course of hearing the case, the Constitutional Court ordered what would be 
described as ‘an interim structural interdict’. It was directed that the parties 
‘engage with each other meaningfully ..., in an effort to resolve the differ-
ences and difficulties aired in this application’. The parties were also ordered 
to file affidavits before the Court on or before 3 October 2007 reporting on 
the results of the engagement between them as at 27 September 2007.93 The 
approach was justified on the basis of the fact that the City has an obligation to 
engage vulnerable people before making decisions that adversely affect them. 
The Court held:
The City has constitutional obligations towards the occupants of Johannesburg. It must 
provide services to communities in a sustainable manner, promote social and economic 
development, and encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations 
in matters of local government. It also has the obligation to fulfil the objectives mentioned 
in the preamble of the Constitution to ‘[i]mprove the quality of life of all citizens and free 
the potential of each person’ .... In light of these constitutional provisions a municipality 
that ejects people from their homes without first meaningfully engaging with them acts in a 
manner that is broadly at odds with the spirit and purpose of the constitutional obligations set 
out in this paragraph taken together.94
In remedial terms, the importance of the approach adopted by the CC in the 
case lies in the fact that besides being the precursor of interim relief, the order 
itself provided interim protection for the applicants against eviction. The 
engagement process resulted in an agreement on interim measures by which 
the City agreed to take steps to render the buildings safer and more habitable. 
This was to be achieved among others by the installation of chemical toilets, 
the cleaning and sanitation of the buildings, the delivery of refuse bags, and 
the installation of fire extinguishers. A time frame of 21 days was agreed on 
within which these things were to be done.95 The Court found this agreement 
to be ‘a reasonable response to the engagement process’ and commended the 
City for being more humane.96 Furthermore, as is demonstrated below, the 
approach of the Court in promoting dialogue has the potential of obtaining 
91 See City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others (2007) (6) SA 417; 2007 (6) 
BCLR 643. For a discussion of this case see G Quinot ‘An Administrative Law Perspective on “Bad 
Buildings” Evictions in Johannesburg inner city’ (2007) 8(1) ESR Review 25; and C Mbazira, ‘An 
Overview of the Constitutional Court Hearing of the Inner-city Evictions Case’ (2007) 8(3) ESR 
Review 12. 
92 The Court, however, ordered the provision of alternative accommodation by relocation to a tempo-
rary shelter of those in desperate need of housing.
93 At para 5. The Court found justification for this order in the advantages of attempting to resolve a 
dispute amicably; and referred to a number of judicial decisions to justify this. These included the 
Grootboom case and Port Elizabeth v Various Occupiers (Port Elizabeth case) 2005 (1) SA 217 
(CC); 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC), at para 39.
94 Olivia case (note 90 above) para 16. 
95 Ibid para 25. 
96 Ibid para 28. 
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meaningful enforcement of the court orders with the least involvement of the 
court.
Nonetheless, in spite of the seemingly progressive approach in Rand 
Properties, the Constitutional Court is yet to define the norms and principles 
governing the structural interdict. The Sibiya case, however, shows that the 
Court is willing to be guided by some norms and principles on how to exer-
cise supervisory jurisdiction. The principles in this case, however, need to 
be developed and applied consistently and in a broader manner. This is in 
addition to the fact that the principles thus far address only one aspect of 
the structural interdict: the supervision process. There is need for a compre-
hensive list of norms and principles which address not only the supervision 
process but also the process of determining when the relief is appropriate. 
The principles deduced from the Sibiya case could be developed together with 
those deduced from the approach of the High Courts into a comprehensive 
set of structural relief norms and principles. This is what the next section sets 
out to do.
iV norMs and prinCiples for the struCtural interdiCt
Roach and Budlender have made an attempt to define some of the principles 
that could guide the courts in determining when a structural interdict is an 
appropriate remedy.97 They argue that the remedy should be granted where 
there is evidence to believe that the government may not comply promptly 
with the court order. The same applies to those cases where the violation 
arises from ‘neglect, inadequate budgets and inadequate training of public 
officials’;98 and where the consequences of ‘even a good-faith failure to com-
ply with a court order are so serious that the court should be at pains to ensure 
effective compliance’.99 Another circumstance where Roach and Budlender 
judge a structural interdict to be appropriate is where there is evidence of 
government’s incompetence or lack of capacity to provide for the rights: ‘[t]
he greater the degree of the government’s incompetence or lack of capacity 
to provide for the rights, the stronger the case for supervisory jurisdiction 
including requirements that government submit a plan and progress reports 
for the court’s approval’.100
While I find Roach and Budlender’s article very useful in defining principles 
guiding the grant of a structural interdict, I find it incomprehensive; indeed, 
Roach and Budlender do not pretend to be comprehensive in this regard. There 
is a host of other norms and principles that could guide the courts in using the 
structural interdict, as discussed below.
97 Roach & Budlender (note 7 above).
98 Ibid 349.
99 Ibid 333. 
100 Ibid 349. 
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(a) Utilisation as a remedy of last resort in a graduated manner
Execution by the courts of administrative functions deemed to be the preserve 
of the executive organ of the state amounts to substitution of executive with 
judicial discretion. Fletcher contends that such substitution becomes legitimate 
only when the political bodies are ‘seriously and chronically in default’. He 
contends that as long as those political bodies remain in default, judicial dis-
cretion may be a necessary and legitimate substitute for political discretion.101 
On a similar note, Eisenberg and Yeazell submit that courts usually intervene 
in institutional cases not so much to take affirmative action in conflict with the 
other branches of government; in their opinion, such intervention is justified 
by the need to fill a vacuum which the other branches have created owing to 
inaction or neglect.102
It is clear from the above that government deficiency, especially one of a 
chronic nature, should be the basis of intervention in what may be considered 
administrative or policy matters. Greater judicial intrusion is, therefore, war-
ranted only if there is a failure by the other organs.103 This notwithstanding, 
the courts should ascertain in the first place whether there is still any chance 
of using executive or legislative discretion to eliminate the constitutional 
violation and to fill the vacuum. If this is still possible, intervention by sub-
stitution of discretion will not be justified. The court’s initial response should 
be aimed at persuading the government to exercise its discretion in a manner 
that eliminates the violation. The government should be given an opportunity 
to display the plans it intends to follow to eliminate the violation. The court 
could also require the parties to negotiate a plan and report back to it. It is 
only when all these attempts fail that the court should intervene by taking 
administrative decisions.
At this level, the courts could exercise what has been described as ‘reme-
dial absentation’.104 A court exercising remedial absentation merely retains 
jurisdiction to stop the infringement while allowing the state to formulate 
a remedial plan indicating how it intends to end the infringement. At this 
stage, the court should only order the defendant to produce a plan for judicial 
evaluation. The order may be accompanied by guidelines suggested by the 
court. This is important, not only because a defendant making a good faith 
attempt may need guidance, but also because a recalcitrant defendant will 
produce an inadequate plan unless closely instructed.105 This approach limits 
judicial involvement in what may be viewed as policy matters. Additionally, it 
allows the court to harvest the special expertise of the defendant and to secure 
co-operation in this regard. Remedial absentation should be contrasted with 
101 Fletcher (note 24 above) 637.
102 Eisenberg & Yeazell (note 24 above) 495–496. See also D Horowitz The Courts and Social Policy 
(1977) 2 and 24, who submits that one reason for judicial involvement in social policy matters has 
arisen from the reticence of other policymakers. In his opinion, sometimes, although a judicial 
decision on these issues may be imperfect, it may be the best that is available.
103 Special Project (note 17 above) 823.
104 Ibid 796.
105 Ibid 798.
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judicially-imposed remedies, which are formulated without the benefit of the 
expertise or skills of the parties and may be considered to be intrusive.106
It should be noted, however, that there could be circumstances where a 
judicially-imposed remedy is needed. This occurs in those cases where it 
is necessary to alleviate an intolerable condition immediately, or where the 
case implicates non-systemic aspects susceptible to immediate relief. Even 
then, the court may be forced to combine judicial imposition with remedial 
absentation. The Westville case is an example of this:107 the Court ordered that 
the applicants be provided with ARVs immediately, in addition to the state 
filing a plan on how it intended to comply with the Court’s order. Immediate 
relief was provided to the applicants, and a long-term remedy was sought for 
similarly-situated people. This made it possible for benefits to be provided to 
the applicants even when an appeal had been lodged. The Olivia case tells the 
same story.
(b) Participation
Whatever the form taken by structural litigation, the court must strive to ensure 
that it brings on board the widest array of stakeholders. This applies espe-
cially to those persons who may be affected by any relief ordered in the case. 
Participation of a wide array of stakeholders has many advantages, especially 
as regards the implementation of the remedy and attendance to polycentric 
interests implicated by the case. Abram Chayes has submitted that:
Public law litigation, because of its widespread impact, seems to call for adequate representa-
tion in the proceedings of the range of interests that will be affected by them. At the stage 
of relief in particular, if the decree is to be quasi-negotiated and party participation is to be 
relied upon to ensure its viability, representation at the bargaining table assumes very great 
importance, not only from the point of view of the affected interests but from that of the 
system itself.108
The participation should focus on individuals, groups or organisations whose 
interest may be affected by the case.109 In the context of government as the 
defendant, it may be necessary to ascertain the interests of other spheres or 
departments of government. In semi-federal South Africa, as defined by the 
Constitution,110 national, provincial and local government interests may be 
invoked in the case. The case may also implicate constitutional competences 
of these spheres of government as regards the provision of social goods and 
106 Ibid 800. See also Roach & Budlender (note 7 above) 346.
107 Note 3 above. 
108 Chayes (note 13 above) 1310. 
109 Sturm (note 10 above) 1410.
110 Section 40. 
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services.111 Ignoring these interests and competences may affect the efficacy 
of the remedy obtained and may lead to imposition of remedial burdens which 
fall outside a government sphere’s constitutional mandates. Involvement 
of a wide range of stakeholders is also necessary in securing collaboration 
between the different spheres or departments of government and the different 
stakeholders in the remedial process. It is also important to note that govern-
ment programmes often consist of partially co-ordinated outputs of a number 
of departments and organs of state. In addition to the state actors, there could 
also be non-state actors such as trade unions and organised groups which 
influence the direction of the government programme.112 It is prudent that 
these actors be consulted if necessary and practicable.
Sturm has suggested that the forms of interaction used in the decision-
making process should promote involvement, co-operation and consensus. 
He suggests further that the process should also mitigate the unequal power, 
resources, and sophistication of participants.113 This is important because it 
establishes equality of participation in the process and encourages parties to 
bring their interests to the fore without fear. It is particularly important with 
regard to socio-economic rights because of the imbalance of power which 
usually exists between poor and marginalised communities and powerful 
government or other artificial entities.
It is also vital that institutional reform includes identification of the vari-
ous groups and entities whose co-operation is necessary. This is in addition 
to ascertainment of the needs and interests of those groups and entities, and 
assessment of the likely impact of any proposed reforms on their interests.114 
The involvement of a wide variety of participants increases the number of 
alternative remedial proposals before the court.115 Participation will also allow 
all the stakeholders to be educated on the nature of the case, the remedial 
plan, and its likely impact. If crucial stakeholders misunderstand the remedy, 
implementation may be grounded simply because they do not know both what 
to do and the objectives to be realised:116
When those excluded complain, often justifiably, that their position has not received a fair 
hearing, political as well as bureaucratic obstacles to implementation are often created. Thus, 
in order to minimise opposition to implementation, it is advisable to invite the participation 
at the decree formulation stage of relevant non-parties ... Participation by such non-parties 
may have another advantage: they may raise policy and implementation factors overlooked 
by the plaintiffs and defendant administrators yet pertinent to the shaping of the decree. The 
court can employ various procedural devices to promote this expanded participation, such 
111 See Schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution for the competences of the different spheres of govern-
ment. See also C Mbazira Realising Socio-economic Rights in the South African Constitution  The 
Obligations of Local Government. A Guide for Municipalities (2006); J De Visser ‘A Perspective 
on Local Government’s Role in Realising the Right to Housing and the Answer of the Grootboom 
Judgment’ 8 (2004) 2 Law, Democracy & Development 201; and J De Visser ‘Powers of Local 
Government’ (2002) 17 SA Public Law 223.
112 Note (note 21 above) 433.
113 Sturm (note 10 above) 1410.
114 Note (note 21 above) 433.
115 Special Project (note 17 above) 804.
116 Note (note 21 above) 440. 
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as inviting groups whose interests may be affected by the decree to file amicus briefs or, if 
necessary, to intervene at the remedial stage.117
However, the remedial process should not be diluted by participation to the 
extent that effective remediation and reasoned decision making are lost. As 
discussed below,118 reasoned decision making is another norm that has to be 
realised by structural litigation.119 The same could be said in regard to effective 
remediation. The consensual remedial model, as discussed above,120 appears 
to be the most suitable for realising the norm of participation. This model 
may, however, sacrifice reasoned decision making and effective remediation. 
Nonetheless, this depends on how the process is conducted and the oversight 
role played by the court. The court could direct the parties on agreements 
which are based on reason, and may reject those which do not realise effec-
tive remediation. Participation should also not be allowed to slow down the 
remedial process unnecessarily.121
(c) Impartiality and judicial independence
Impartiality and judicial independence is a norm to be preserved in all forms 
of judicial processes. The need for impartiality accords legitimacy to the judi-
cial process and plays a very important role in producing remedies which are 
acceptable not only to the parties but to the public at large. It should be noted, 
however, that the need for impartiality and independence in structural litiga-
tion is not only relevant but also complex. This is because of the active role 
played by the judge, not only in formulating the remedy but also in its imple-
mentation. Impartiality and judicial independence are also heightened by the 
administrative nature of the tasks that the judge has to discharge and his or 
her continued involvement in the reformation process. This is because such 
participation may threaten the judge’s independence and impartiality. Fiss has 
thus warned that, to some extent, this threat is tied to a peculiar characteristic 
of the structural remedy, as it places the judge in an architectural relationship 
with the newly reconstituted state bureaucracy. Fiss submits that a judge is 
likely to identify with the organisation he or she is reconstructing, and that 
such identification is strengthened with each cycle of remediation.122
Fiss’s statement should nevertheless be qualified. It is true only in those 
cases where the same judge has been involved with an institution for a con-
siderably long time and has discharged functions that place him or her in an 
adminstrative position in that institution. Yet, the judge could still use his or 
her judicial training to distance him- or herself from the institution. This may 
not, however, be easy; the judge must strive to ensure that his or her decisions 
are fair, unbiased and supported by facts that are related to the legal problem 
117 Ibid 440.
118 Section (d). 
119 Sturm (note 10 above) 1418.
120 Section II (a). 
121 See Special Project (note 17 above) 812.
122 O Fiss ‘Foreword: The Forms of Justice’ (1979) 93 Harv LR 1, 53.
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in issue.123 Judicial independence would also allow the judge to make judicial 
orders, without interference, on the basis of legal standards and norms. It 
therefore remains the duty of the judge not only to assert his independence, 
but also to avoid being unnecessarily involved in tasks that would undermine 
this independence. Where a political organ can make remedial decisions, this 
should be considered a measure of first resort, and judicial usurpation of the 
process a matter of last resort. This is not to ignore the fact that in some cases 
it may be plainly clear that the political processes have failed and that court 
assumption of the task is the only reasonable thing to do. Even then, the politi-
cal process should be given a second chance, although under the supervision 
of the court.124
Fiss contends that the expert is used as an intermediate structure whicht 
stands between the judge and the institution, on the one hand, and on the 
other hand, between the judge and the body politic.125 Nevertheless, it is not 
necessary for the court to give itself a posture of complete disinterest, consid-
ering the fact that the court is the bearer of the ultimate obligation to devise 
an effective remedy. In South Africa, the courts need not exhibit complete 
disinterest; this is because they are expressly mandated to review the con-
stitution and guarantee appropriate relief.126 Even when a court delegates the 
obligation to an expert, the expert is, to all intents and purposes, deemed 
to be a representative of the court. The court must ensure that the remedy, 
whether devised by the expert or by the court itself, enforces the substantive 
legal norms. And also, as seen above,127 the expert model inherently exposes 
the expert to perceptions of partiality on his or her part, especially where 
participation is not guaranteed to its fullest. According to Nagel, the experts 
‘are not judges and therefore neither their training nor role necessarily assures 
the habits and capacities required for the kind of disciplined impartiality we 
expect of judges’.128
Nagel contends further that judges cannot be counted on to correct any bias 
in the formulation of the decree because the facts in the expert’s report are 
traditionally alterable only` if clearly erroneous.129 It is my considered view, 
however, that the possibility of bias can be overcome if the judge keeps a close 
eye on the expert and requires periodic updates. The courts should also take 
care not to appoint experts who are close to the interests of one of the parties. 
In some cases, it may serve the interests of justice if more than one expert is 
appointed; a panel of experts as opposed to an individual expert is less likely 
to be biased. But this does not mean that all cases merit the appointment of a 
123 Sturm (note 10 above) 1410.
124 See discussion of the norm of utilisation as a remedy of last resort in a graduated manner at section 
IV(a) above. 
125 O Fiss The Civil Rights Injunction (1978) 56. 
126 See sections 38 and 172 of the Constitution of South Africa, 1996.
127 At section II(a). 
128 R Nagel ‘Controlling the Structural Injunction’ (1984) 7 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 
395, 403 to 404.
129 Ibid 404.
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panel. The magnitude of the task to be accomplished should also be a factor to 
consider in deciding whether or not a panel as opposed to an individual expert 
should be appointed.
(d) Reasoned decision making
One of the criticisms levelled against structural litigation is that it relegates 
reasoned decision making to the background and exalts remedies reached 
through negotiation.130 There is, therefore, a need for structural remedies to be 
based on reasoned decision making. Structural litigation should be conducted 
with open awareness of the fact that the litigation implicates interests beyond 
those of the parties. The court should determine whether the case negatively 
impacts on interests other than those of the parties. In addition to this, the 
court should support its decisions with legal norms and standards in the form 
of normative standards established, for instance, in the Bill of Rights. This is 
where reasoned decision making becomes relevant, as reflected in the way the 
judge interprets and applies the normative standards in issue.
The judge has to justify his or her decision as based on the law. This helps to 
forestall accusations that the judge has applied his or her own value judgement 
to decide the case. Reasoned decision making in structural litigation terms 
therefore gives legitimacy to judicial intervention as being based on legal 
norms and the need to solve systemic problems. When remedies are based 
on reasoned decision making, they accord legitimacy to the process, which 
translates into acceptance of the directions issued by the court.
The expert remedial formulation model131 is more capable of realising 
reasoned decision making in comparison with the bargaining and legislative 
hearing models. Usually, the court-appointed experts come with technical 
expertise and a capacity to gather and assess large quantities of informa-
tion. In spite of this, whether a case requires an expert model of remediation 
should depend on the circumstances of the case. If a case has many technical 
aspects which need to be assessed before an effective remedy is crafted, it 
will definitely need expert help. But if a case merely requires ascertainment of 
some factual aspects, the hearing model and not the expert model may be the 
most appropriate. Reasoned decision making should, therefore, not be exalted 
blindly by appointing an expert without first considering the circumstances 
of the case.
Finally, it should be noted that reasoned decision making also promotes the 
principle that aims at ensuring that remediation complies with the substantive 
norm, as discussed in the next subsection. The substantive norm is the law 
which protects the right(s) in issue.
130 O Fiss ‘Against Settlement’ (1984) 93 Yale LJ 1073, 1083. See also Horowitz (note 102 above) 
22.
131 See section II(a) above. 
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(e) Remedy that complies with substantive norms
The reason people litigate is to enforce their rights. The remedies must, there-
fore, as much as possible, be intended to realise the rights. It should not be 
denied, though, that in certain cases, the interests of justice might require 
that the remedy granted should be one that most appropriately attends to the 
demands of the case. This is even when the remedy selected is incapable of 
realising the right in full. This does not, however, mean that the court should 
completely abandon the need to develop the substantive rights as protected.
It is advisable that the court begins by detailing the normative standards 
implicated by the right. In the context of socio-economic rights, this approach 
would help to give content to the rights. This is important because of the fact 
that the Constitutional Court is yet to give substantive content to the socio-
economic rights in the Constitution.132 Giving substantive content to the rights 
helps the court and the parties to understand what they are working towards.133 
The remedies will be structured with these objectives in mind. The normative 
content also provides a basis upon which the efficacy of the remedies selected 
can be criticised and evaluated. In addition, the Court will use these norma-
tive standards to ensure that its model of supervision is the most effective in 
terms of realising the objectives of the substantive norms.
(f) Flexibility, monitoring and supervision
In litigation challenging systemic violations, the court may embark on a search 
for the most appropriate remedy without full knowledge of the requisite facts, 
interests and obstacles relevant in this regard. The necessarily speculative 
nature of this enterprise therefore means that no single order can be regarded 
as final. Additionally, implementation of the remedy may continue for a long 
time.134 According to Fiss, the remedy ‘must always be open to revision, even 
without the strong showing traditionally required for modification of a decree, 
namely, that the first choice is causing grievous hardship. A revision is justified 
if the remedy is not working effectively or is unnecessarily burdensome’.135
It is therefore important that the court should proceed with flexibility and 
craft its decree in a manner that allows easy adjustment, should the need to 
do so arise.136 The need to revise the decree is made inevitable because of the 
detailed nature of structural decrees, and sometimes because of the lack of 
132 Bilchitz (note 56 above).
133 K Iles ‘Limiting Socio-Economic Rights: Beyond the Internal Limitation Clauses’ (2004) 20 SAJHR 
448, 454. See also Pieterse (note 55 above) 410; and Davis (note 2 above) 304–5.
134 Special Project (note 17 above) 789.
135 Fiss (note 122 above) 49. Fiss also notes that it is this which explains the fact that specificity usually 
comes at a late stage of the remedial process. The judge will begin with very broad remediation and 
gradually move to specifics.
136 See Doucet-Boudreau case (note 72 above) para 68. In the TAC case (note 5 above), the Constitutional 
Court observed that a factor that needs to be kept in mind is that policy is and should be flexible and 
that court orders concerning policy choices made by the executive should not be formulated in ways 
that preclude the executive from making such legitimate choices (at para 114).
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judicial expertise in drafting some of them, since some of the experts who 
draft these decrees may not have a judicial background.137
The court may also have to monitor closely the implementation of its order 
and obtain information that may be needed to make adjustments in the reme-
dial standards should the need to do so arise.138 This can be achieved only 
if the court retains jurisdiction and assumes an active oversight role.139 The 
court should nevertheless be careful not to interfere with the implementation 
process if it is not necessary to do so. Although the parties should be relied on 
for information and the need for adjustments, the court should be careful not 
to be distracted by parties who may be interested in protecting their interests 
at the expense of other equally important interests. Plaintiffs may underplay 
the degree of compliance, while defendants may exaggerate it. All this may 
distract the remedial process.
The need to adjust the court order may also arise, for instance, when it tran-
spires during the implementation period that the defendant cannot successfully 
implement the decree without the co-operation of persons or departments not 
party to the original suit.140 Other participants whose co-operation is needed 
may, for instance, include different spheres of government. In such an event, 
notice should be served on the third party participants, with a view to deter-
mining whether they are opposed to the order, and the likely impact that it 
may have on their activities. In other cases it may merely be necessary to 
widen the geographical scope of the order. Some adjustments of the order may 
be motivated by changed legal standards, especially following decisions of 
higher courts or even legislative enactments.
V ConClusion
The South African courts have not comprehensively defined norms and prin-
ciples that could be used to determine the appropriateness of the structural 
interdict. In this paper, I have illustrated some of these norms and principles. I 
would nonetheless not pretend that the norms and principles I propose here are 
exhaustive. I have provided a foundation on which one may build additional 
norms and principles.
It is important that the courts should only intervene by way of a structural 
interdict where the other branches are ‘seriously and chronically in default’ 
as regards the exercise of their discretion.141 Even then, intervention should be 
graduated,142 choosing first to merely retain jurisdiction and allow the state to 
tackle the constitutional violation. This could be followed by a requirement 
137 Most structural decrees arise from negotiated settlements and the court may not be able to anticipate 
the impact of every aspect of the decree. It is, therefore, fair that the judge oversees implementation 
of the decree to be able to make adjustments should the need to do so arise.
138 Note (note 21 above) 440.
139 See Special Project (note 17 above) 817.
140 Ibid 818.
141 Fletcher (note 24 above) 637. See also Eisenberg & Yeazell (note 24 above) 495–496. 
142 See Fiss (note 122 above) 35–36; and K Cooper-Stephenson ‘Principle and Pragmatism in the Law 
of Remedies’ in J Berryman (ed) Remedies, Issues and Perspectives (1991) 1, 36.
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to submit a report to the court and to the opposite party detailing the plan 
to eradicate the violation. Where necessary, the court may more intrusively 
devise the plan and supervise its implementation. It has been cautioned, how-
ever, that there could be cases which are of such a very serious nature that a 
high degree of intervention is immediately necessary.143
In all these processes, the court should ensure that all persons whose 
interests may be affected by the litigation process participate in the remedial 
formulation process to the extent that this is necessary and practicable.144 
The courts could use various models of the structural interdict, including the 
expert model and the legislative hearing model, to realise this. The remedy 
should be flexible, and the court should be prepared, if need be, to adjust it at 
any time.145 The adjustments also allow the judge to find what is considered to 
be the most appropriate means of responding to the constitutional violation. 
This is because, usually, the structural interdict may begin as experimenta-
tion of several remedies, and perfection may only come after a number of 
adjustments.146
Sometimes the main issue is not when a violation is going to be uprooted. 
Rather the issue is what steps are being undertaken to begin the uprooting 
process. In such a context, it is the direction and rate of change that may be 
important and not the final outcomes, as these may still be too far away.147 
Reform may be slow and almost viewed as amounting to failure, but this may 
be necessary to accommodate the unforeseen obstacles. A slow but steady 
process of uprooting the violation is far better than short-term artificial mea-
sures which may not overcome all the obstacles ahead. Artificial or ‘quick fix’ 
measures, although dramatic, may stall or dissipate in the long run.
It is important that the court take its time to study all the obstacles so that 
it is able to fashion long-term solutions to them. It is because of this that the 
US Supreme Court in the Brown case,148 for instance, initially merely ordered 
that the state act with all deliberate speed and advised the local courts to act 
with flexibility in their remedial exercise. This provided both the state and the 
courts with time to study the obstacles and to find solutions to them. It also 
illustrates the concern of a court to provide space for public authorities to 
implement a far-reaching and contentious order gradually.149
143 The Westville case (note 3 above) has been given as an example. In spite of this, one sees that the 
graduated response is still applied to a certain extent.
144 See Chayes (note 13 above) 1310; and Sturm (note 10 above) 1410. 
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